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A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States is in the middle of a federal revolution. The idea of liberty, which animated the 
Declaration of Independence and created the basis of the nation, is now being used to subvert 
federalism. “Liberty” has become a synonym of state self-government, of freedom from big 
government’s encroachments. In the last decade, several states have maintained policies inconsistent 
with federal statutes and considered measures aimed at defying federal regulations in different areas: 
gun control, government-issued identification cards, marijuana legalization, the Common Core State 
Standards Initiative (that sets standards for K12 students in English and mathematics) and, most 
pertinently for this paper, healthcare. 
The recent opposition to the reform of the private health insurance market is perhaps the most 
instructive example of this scepticism of federal authority; states are reluctant to accept federal funds 
and to cooperate for the implementation of core measures of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).1 Not 
happy with the result of legal challenges,2 a number of state legislatures are also considering bills aimed 
at nullifying federal intervention within their boundaries. Nullification, in this paper, is the term used 
to describe a formal declaration by a state legislature that a specified federal regulation is void within 
its borders. The main argument put forward by these measures is the defence of a founding fathers´ 
principle, the idea that vertical separation of powers would best suit American diversity and protect 
individual liberty. But what kind of liberty are these measures really invoking? Liberty from a 
“coercive” federal government that “exceeds the bounds of its limited powers and encroaches on the 
authorities reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment”.3 It is therefore evident that the principle 
of individual liberty is being used to justify a revival of states’ rights. In this conception, ‘liberty’ is 
interpreted as freedom from the authority of the federal government, not from that of the state authority. 
Some states strongly believe that healthcare regulation should be their exclusive province and the most 
radical bills against the ACA recall Madison’s theory of interposition and Jefferson’s theory of 
nullification.  
This work provides a portrait of the current nullification movement and sheds light on the 
constitutional controversies that surround it.   
 
 
B. THE NOBLE ORIGINS OF NULLIFICATION: FOUNDING FATHERS  
The term nullification was first used by founding father Thomas Jefferson in his Kentucky Resolution 
(1798) and the concept of states’ rights against the encroachment of the federal power was recalled by 
James Madison in his Virginia Resolution (1798).  
Jefferson formally used the term nullification in his original draft of the Kentucky Resolution4 
and defined it as “a natural right” on the part of a sovereign state to self-defence from the usurpation of 
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the federal government. He argued that “where powers are assumed which have not been delegated, a 
nullification of the act is the rightful remedy” and that the states “are not united on the principle of 
unlimited submission to their general government” but “they constituted a general government for 
special purposes” and “delegated to that government certain definite powers, reserving, each State to 
itself, the residuary mass of right to their own self-government”. Relevant literature5 tends to interpret 
Jefferson’s Resolution only as a plea for a joint nullification by the states but it seems to me that Jefferson 
was also in favour of nullification by a single state within its borders and was only calling for the 
cooperation of other states:  
 
every State has a natural right in cases not within the compact, (casus non fœderis) 
to nullify of their own authority all assumptions of power by others within their 
limits (…) that nevertheless, this commonwealth, from motives of regard and 
respect for its co-States, has wished to communicate with them [the other 
states]on the subject.6  
 
In his Virginia Resolution Madison did not use the word “nullification” but introduced the term 
“interposition”, conceived as a joined intervention of the states to stop the violation of the Constitution 
and invalidate the law:  
 
in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers, not 
granted by the said compact, the states who are parties thereto, have the right, and 
are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for 
maintaining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights and liberties 
appertaining to them.7 
 
 The Virginia Resolution, rather than nullifying the law straight away, declares its 
unconstitutionality and invokes the concurrence of other states to take “the necessary and proper 
measures […] for co-operating with this state, in maintaining the Authorities, Rights, and Liberties, 
referred to the States respectively, or to the people”. It is Madison’s formulation, I suggest, that has 
inspired a recent Virginia Senate Joint Resolution8 which does not openly declare opposition but makes 
application to Congress for calling an amendment convention pursuant to Article V of the United 
States Constitution aimed at restraining the power of the federal government. The convention would 
be “limited to proposing amendments to the United States Constitution that impose fiscal restraints on 
the federal government, limit the power and jurisdiction of the federal government, and limit the terms 
of office for its officials and for members of Congress”.9 Prof. Levinson also described a new 
convention as an “opportunity for a thorough discussion about the genuine meaning of a federal system 
in the twenty-first century and what kinds of institutions are best designed to implement that 
meaning”.10 
Also, there is a possibility that the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions’ call for a joint effort by 
the states and for the protection of states’ rights has inspired recent bills establishing a union of states 
against the ACA. I am referring to the so-called Heath Care Compact, an agreement of a group of 
states joining together to establish broad healthcare programs that operate outside of the ACA.11 To 
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date, nine states have joined the Health Care Compact (Oklahoma, Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, 
Missouri, South Carolina, Texas, Utah and Kansas), and a total of 26 states have considered interstate 
compact legislation.12 However, the Compact remains only a proposal for now; in order to come into 
effect it must be passed by both chambers of Congress.13 
The current use/misuse of Jefferson and Madison’s nullification and interposition language 
demonstrates that not only the seeds of such a controversial phenomenon can be found in the early 
days of the federation, but also that the debate about the meaning of the federation is still alive and 
reiterates the same arguments.  
 
C. THE NULLIFICATION PHENOMENON 
 
In my research of legislation in 50 states I have examined nullification bills proposed and enacted in 
2014 against the ACA. From my data, collected using the NCSL Affordable Care Act Legislative 
Database powered by Lexis Nexis StateNet, it emerges that the legislatures of 26 states have 
considered at least 120 bills aimed at nullifying the ACA; 37 bills have been signed into law by 10 
state legislatures.  My analysis of these nullification measures not only reveals common “noble” 
ideological origins but also identifies a common argument, two common philosophical underpinnings 
and a common starting point:  
• Common argument: healthcare regulation should be the exclusive province of the states as no 
police power is conferred to the Congress by Art. 1 sec. 8 of the US Constitution.   
• Two philosophical underpinnings: the originalist interpretation of the Commerce Clause14 and 
the call for protection of state rights under the Tenth Amendment15. 
• Starting point: alleged unconstitutionality of a federal bill/measure: the state legislature 
believes that a measure is unconstitutional and approves a bill to nullify its effects within its 
borders.   
In spite of the above mentioned common grounds, the content and aims of the bills varies 
greatly and I would suggest a classification into three groups:  
 
1. Bills declaring the ACA and its core provision “the individual mandate” unconstitutional and 
therefore inapplicable within the state; 
2. Bills adopting measures to prohibit state agencies or employees from implementing the individual 
mandate within the state; 
3. Bills establishing membership of the interstate health compact, a project that would transfer the 
authority and responsibility to make healthcare decisions from federal control to the member states.  
 
An instructive example of bills of the first group is South Carolina Senate Bill n. 147/ 2014 which 
declares that the ACA “is not authorized by the Constitution of the United States and violates its true 
meaning and intent as given by the Founders and Ratifiers, and is invalid in this State, is not recognized 
by this State, is specifically rejected by this State, and is null and void and of no effect in this State.”16  
For the second group, the most recently approved nullification bill is Arizona’s Proposition 122, 
approved on 4th November 2014 general election ballot. The proposition amended Article 2, Section 3 
of the Arizona Constitution to declare the ability of the state to “exercise its sovereign authority to 
restrict the actions of its personnel and the use of its financial resources to purposes that are consistent 
with the Constitution” and that “this state and all political subdivisions of this state are prohibited from 
using any personnel or financial resources to enforce, administer or cooperate with the designated 
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federal action or program.” The amendment enshrines the so called anti-commandeering doctrine, 
according to which the federal government cannot impose targeted, affirmative, coercive duties upon 
state legislators or executive officials.17 
Finally, with regards to the third group of bills, intended to authorize joining the Interstate 
Compact, Louisiana House Bill 1909 reads: 
 
The federal government has enacted many laws that have pre-empted state laws 
with respect to healthcare and placed increasing strain on state budgets, impairing 
other responsibilities such as education, infrastructure, and public safety. The 
member states seek to protect individual liberty and personal control over 
healthcare decisions and believe the best method to achieve these ends is by 
vesting regulatory authority over healthcare with the states. The Interstate Health 
Care Compact is hereby enacted into law and entered into by the state of 
Louisiana with any other states legally joining the compact in a form substantially 
similar to the form contained in this Part. 
 
Most of the nullification bills have been proposed by Southern States, with Tennessee, Oklahoma 
and Georgia in the front line (respectively, 14, 12 and 10 bills). Significant absences are Texas and 
Florida. Five of the states proposing nullification bills used to be part of the Confederacy and all the 
states proposing nullification bills are red, i.e. Republican, states. 
 
D. NULLIFICATION:  
CONSTITUTIONAL PROFANITY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY? 
 
Up until this point, my paper has provided a portrait of the nullification phenomenon and discussed its 
origins. In light of the current size of the phenomenon and its “noble” origins, it is now paramount to 
explore the constitutional controversies that surround the movement. Hence, the rest of this paper is an 
effort to answer the following question: is nullification a legitimate exercise of states’ rights? 
My findings differ greatly depending on the type of nullification bill in question. For this reason, 
I will examine the constitutionality of three different types of nullification measures in turn.   
Specifically, referring to my previous classification, bills of type 1 (declaring the ACA and its 
core provision “the individual mandate” unconstitutional and therefore inapplicable within the state) 
would not be a valid exercise of states’ rights according to the Supremacy Clause18 which clearly 
establishes the preeminence of federal law over state law. As UCLA professor Adam Winkler comments 
- “Any law that interferes with a valid federal law is unconstitutional. […] The federal government can 
pass legislation in an area, and people who are citizens of the states have to obey that legislation.”19 At 
this point, supporters of nullification bills would object that they are only invalidating legislation that 
they deem unconstitutional and therefore not supreme; that sovereign states created and ratified the 
Constitution and therefore retain the prerogative to interpret the Constitution. Considering this objection, 
the key question turns out to be: do state legislatures have the authority to declare federal legislation 
unconstitutional? In the American constitutional tradition, judicial review20 is a prerogative of the 
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Supreme Court (Marbury v Madison) 21 and claiming that states can declare federal law unconstitutional 
would also ignore the unanimous Cooper v Aaron’s holding, 22 according to which state attempts to 
nullify federal law are ineffective as the states are bound by US Supreme Court rulings. There are, as a 
consequence, two constitutional “obstacles” to the legitimacy of type 1 nullification bills: judicial review 
and judicial supremacy of the Supreme Court. Can these obstacles be overcome? What follows is a brief 
review of the literature dealing with those two principles.  
With regard to judicial review, relevant conservative literature23 seems to be sceptical of Marbury 
and has developed arguments against the attribution of this power to the Supreme Court itself. One of 
the main arguments is that the Constitution does not grant this power expressly. Article III reads: “The 
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such Courts as 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish” but never mentions judicial review. Also, 
originalists argue that the founders did not contemplate judicial nullification of legislation enacted by 
the states and by Congress. The distinguished historian Leonard Levy asserted: “The evidence seems to 
indicate that the Framers did not mean for the Supreme Court to have authority to void acts of 
Congress.”24 William Crosskey, one of the most provocative legal historians of recent times25, reaches 
the same conclusion: “The rationally indicated conclusion is that judicial review of congressional acts 
was not intended, or provided, in the Constitution.”26 A more recent publication by Prof. William Nelson 
reads: “What makes [Marbury] even more important is the absence of any clear plan on the part of the 
Constitution’s framers to provide the Court with this power”.27  
On the other hand, modern scholarship28 alleges that Marbury is a victim of contemporary 
revisionism and supports the legitimacy of judicial review in light of the assumption that there was a 
historical practice of judicial review in American courts before the decision in Marbury. Unexpectedly, 
even the originalist Randy Barnett supports this view: “Judicial nullification of unconstitutional laws 
is not only consistent with the frame provided by original meaning, it is expressly authorized by the 
text and is entirely justified on originalist grounds.”29Who is right and who is wrong? Maybe the 
Supreme Court’s judicial review power is a distortion; maybe it is the natural creature of the ideologies 
and legal philosophies that surrounded the formation of the US constitutional system;30 what is certain 
is that it is a 200 years old legal tradition and factual reality in the US. Nullification is clearly hitting 
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With regard to judicial supremacy,” academic criticism31 has strongly opposed the idea that the 
Supreme Court should serve as the final, highest arbiter of the Constitution, as expressed in Marbury 
and Cooper v Aaron. A provocative argument is put forward by Prof. Paulsen32 who contends that 
Marbury has created a myth and that a proper reading of Marshall’s decision would actually suggests 
that judicial review is not an “exclusive” power of the judiciary but should be shared between the three 
institutional branches and the states’ government. In his view, judicial jurisdiction does not imply 
judicial supremacy over the other branches of government: 
 
none of the hypotheticals posed by Marshall remotely suggests judicial 
exclusivity or even judicial priority in constitutional interpretation. They all 
involve constitutional questions of a type that could (and should) be considered 
in the ordinary course of business of the legislative and executive branches. There 
is nothing uniquely judicial about them, so as to suggest in any way that 
constitutional interpretation is a uniquely judicial activity.33 
 
A more specific argument for judicial deference to the Congress finds corroboration in particular 
provisions of the Constitution, notably Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.34 As Prof. Kermit 
Roosevelt35 suggests, this assertion advances the argument that the Court should defer to the 
congressional interpretations upon which enforcement legislation is based. However, in my ACA 
nullification case study there is no inter-branch conflict within the federal government but a conflict 
between the federal judiciary and state legislatures representing the people. Hence, more pertinent to 
this paper, which depicts nullification as a movement aimed at protecting individual liberty and therefore 
empowering “The People”, is another challenge to interpretive judicial supremacy which finds its 
ideological roots in the so called “popular constitutionalism”, the idea that ordinary citizens, rather than 
the courts, are the most authoritative interpreters of the Constitution. A recent elaboration of this 
argument can be found in an acclaimed 2004 book by Larry Kramer36 and in the work of Edward 
Hartnett: “With a Constitution made in the name of ‘We the People,’ all of us are legitimately interested 
in the meaning of the Constitution--all of us must be welcome participants in the conversation.”37  
My findings are different with regard to type 2 bills (establishing measures to prohibit state 
agencies or employees from implementing the individual mandate within the state). Bills of this type38 
justify the refusal of the states to comply with federal law with a long-standing legal doctrine which 
would allow the states to decide whether or not it is appropriate to participate in a federal act: the anti-
commandeering doctrine. The doctrine claims to find its legal foundation in three decisions of the 
Supreme Court which established that states cannot be required to help the federal government enforce 
federal acts or regulatory programs. Mike Maharrey,39 Communications Director for the Tenth 
Amendment Center, cites to Prigg v Pennsylvania40 (1842), an early decision in which Justice Joseph 
Story declared the preeminence of federal law but acknowledged that states could not be compelled to 
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enforce federal slave rendition laws. However, the revival of the Tenth Amendment as a limit on the 
power of the federal government really dates from two cases, New York v United States41 (1992) in 
which Justice Sandra O´Connor affirmed that Congress could not require states to “take title” to 
radioactive waste and therefore to compel them to participate in the federal regulatory program: “Either 
type of federal action would 'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal regulatory 
purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority 
between federal and state governments”;  and Printz v United States42 (1997) in which Justice Antonin 
Scalia confirmed that Congress does not have the power to direct the actions of State executive officials 
and therefore cannot require “local chief law enforcement officers” (CLEOs) to perform background-
checks on prospective handgun purchasers. The anti-commandeering principle can also be found in 
the recent National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius43 (2012) decision. The main 
argument concerned the extent to which the single mandate provision of the ACA could be said to be 
authorized by the Commerce Clause power of the federal government. Roberts CJ, who thought that 
the single mandate was outside the scope of the Commerce clause power, sided with the liberal wing 
by upholding it as a valid exercise of the taxing power. A majority of the justices however agreed that 
another challenged provision of the ACA, a significant expansion of Medicaid, was not a valid exercise 
of Congress's spending power as it would coerce states to either accept the expansion or risk losing 
existing Medicaid funding. Justice Anthony Kennedy, found that compelling the states to participate 
in the ACA Medicaid expansion was coercive and unconstitutional under the Spending Clause44 thus 
leaving the states with a “genuine choice whether to participate in the new ACA Medicaid 
expansion.”45  
In light of the above, the question must be: does the anti-commandeering doctrine, as developed 
by the Supreme Court in Sebelius, solve the constitutionality of type 2 bills? 
Yes, this class of bills would survive the scrutiny under the Supreme Court anti-commandeering 
doctrine because the doctrine provides that states (and state officials) are not compelled to enforce 
federal law and that a state can refuse to use its resources to attain federal goals. In other words: as 
long as the states engage in a passive resistance, their (in)actions will be constitutional; but they cannot 
impede the implementation of valid federal law by the federal government in their territory. Sebelius 
allowed the states to opt out of Medicaid expansion but states cannot avoid the implementation of the 
individual mandate and the creation of federal exchanges operating in their territory (fully administered 
by the federal government). Indeed, in case a state decides not to establish a state exchange (a 
marketplace where people can compare and purchase health coverage) the federal government will 
provide a ‘‘fall back’’ exchange for that state, 46 usually through the well-known platform 
Healthcare.gov.  
With regards to type 3 bills (establishing membership of an interstate compact for multiple states 
opposing enforcement), they are certainly constitutional as state compacts are provided by Article I 
Section 10 of the United States Constitution: "no state shall enter into an agreement or compact with 
another state" without the consent of Congress. The matter here is not the constitutionality of interstate 
compact applications but the likelihood of congressional consent to a parallel and independent health 
care system. At first reading, the compact clause would seem to establish that any agreement within 
two or more states requires congressional consent. However, in Virginia v Tennessee the US Supreme 
Court concluded that not all interstate agreements require congressional consent and that such consent 
was required only with respect to those joint state agreements “which may tend to increase and build 
up the political influence of the contracting states so as to encroach upon or impair the supremacy of 
the United States or interfere with their rightful management of particular subjects placed under their 
 
41
 505 US 144.  
42
 521 US 898 (1997). 
43
 567 US ___ (2012), 132 SCt 2566. 
44
 See K S Swendiman and E P Baumrucker, “Selected issues related to the effect of NFIB v Sebelius on the 
medicaid expansion requirements in section 2001 of the Affordable Care Act.” (16 July 2012) Congressional 
Research Service. 
45
 Sebelius, Roberts, C J, slip opinion at 57. 
46
 If a state fails to create an Exchange under Section 1311 of the ACA, the Act directs the federal Department of 
Health and Human Services to create an Exchange for that state. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation 
Act, Pub L N 111-152, §1204, 124 Stat 1029, 1321 (2010). 
	

entire control.” 47 It would therefore appear that there are two kinds of compacts: those that require 
congressional consent because they affect federal interests and those that do not because no federal 
interests are affected.48 The Health Care Compact would, in light of this premise, fall within the first 
category because it aims at transferring the authority on healthcare from federal control to the member 
states and to create an independent healthcare system. Would the Congress ever approve an interstate 
health compact? It is the opinion of the author that this is quite improbable. However, with the prospect 
of a Tea-party advancement in 2016 elections, supported by the candidature of Tea-Party Senator Ted 
Cruz as president49, that improbability might be much more conceivable.  
 
E. CONCLUSION 
Much of the debate, both scholarly and political, considers nullification as buried in 1789,50 a non-
starter,51 an antebellum relic,52 a discredited theory risen from the grave,53 one example of 
contemporary zombie (or dinosaur) constitutionalism.54 Nonetheless, my research of legislation in 50 
states demonstrates that nullification is very much a live issue that has even penetrated certain state 
legislatures. Beyond the nature of the phenomenon itself, this paper is concerned with the theory of 
nullification and, ultimately, with the controversies of such a radical assertion of states’ rights for 
American federalism. In particular, the revival of nullification raises deep vertical separation of powers 
questions: namely the adequacy of a growing regulatory role for the federal government and the 
desirability of federal intervention in matters of social policy in such a way as to materially interfere 
with the traditional powers of the states. On the other hand, it is also possible to recognize a veiled 
horizontal separation of powers issue55: state legislatures are claiming for themselves the ability to 
pronounce upon the constitutionality of federal laws, effectively trying to usurp the judicial function.  
In conclusion, a consideration, a conjecture and an admonition.  
A consideration: rebus sic stantibus, the debate on radical states’ rights movement (i.e. 
nullification) has captured the attention of enthusiastic constitutional theorists and of states’ legislators 
but has not yet reached Washington. A conjecture: in the current highly polarized political climate, 
with a Republican Party agenda dominated by the increasingly influential libertarian Tea Party, this is 
arguably what Jason Frank56 would call “a constituent moment” and therefore, a period of turbulence 
in federalism, American-style. I am referring to the same conjecture that I have introduced when 
discussing the possibility of a Congressional approval of the Interstate Health Care Compact. Given 
the rise of popular constitutionalism and originalism,57 promoted mainly by the Tea- Party, there are 
reasons to speculate on the possibility that the dispute over the role of the federal government and its 
relationship to individual rights (culminated in the nullification discourse) could effectively evolve 
from mere constitutional argument to constitutional change. An admonition: the constitutional change 
would be successful and enduring as long the movement is able to solve the libertarian paradox that 
Prof. Rebecca E. Zietlow has delineated in her article “Popular originalism? The Tea Party movement 
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and constitutional theory.”58 The paradox consists in the simultaneous embracing of two different 
doctrines: originalism (the doctrine according to which the interpretation of a written constitution 
should seek the original public meaning of the words of the text or be consistent with what was meant 
by those who drafted and ratified the original meaning of the provisions at the time that they were 
adopted) and popular constitutionalism (ie the idea that it is desirable for people other than judges to 
engage in constitutional interpretation59). The advocates of nullification will have to make a choice: 
originalism or popular constitutionalism. This is to avoid a clash of the two holdings which would 
result in judicial activism. As Prof. Zietlow has commented, those two doctrines are indeed 
incompatible: 
 
Originalists believe that a single fixed meaning exists and is discernible by 
examining the text and the intent of the Framers or the original public meaning 
of the text. By contrast, popular constitutionalists accept the possibility that the 
text has multiple meanings and that the meaning of the text may change through 
the process of construction by the political branches. To that extent, popular 
constitutionalism is premised on the existence of a living Constitution, a concept 
that is antithetical to most originalists. 
 
The nullification controversy demonstrates a fundamental concern over the role of the federal 
government and the limits of congressional power. The ACA is not the only battlefield, constitutional 
conservatives have numerous issues of concern: drug control, Second Amendment rights,60 Right to 
Try,61 Agenda 21,62 Common Core63. This debate deserves academic attention as it is likely to affect 
lawmakers and the broad US political landscape in coming years with the potential to radically reshape 
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